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Abstract
Following World War I, rent control became a standard policy response to the housing shortage
and the resulting rent increases. Typically, economists blame it for creating inefficiencies in
the housing market and beyond. We investigate whether rental market regulations (including
rent control, protection of tenants from eviction, and housing rationing) had any effects in a
middle-income Latin American economy, such as Argentina. To answer this question, we take
advantage of a wide range of housing market indicators and restrictive rental regulation indices
covering almost one century. Using a standard OLS model and MARS, a non-linear estimation
technique, we find that rental market regulations have exerted a statistically significant nega-
tive impact on the growth rates of the real housing rents. However, they were only effective for
short periods following both World Wars, when regulations were novel and particularly strong.
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1. Introduction
Following World War I, rent control became a standard policy response to housing shortages
and the resulting rent increases. Virtually all countries used such policies throughout 20th
century. Typically, economists stigmatize it for creating inefficiencies in the housing market
and beyond. In this study, we investigate whether it had any effects in Argentina, a middle-
income Latin American country. To answer this question, we take advantage of a wide range
of housing market indicators and restrictive rental regulation indices for Argentina covering
more than 100 years. We find that rent control exerted a statistically significant impact on the
performance of its housing market.
Since the turn of the 20th century, the phenomenon of urbanization in Latin America, in
general, and Argentina, in particular, is perceived as rapidly increasing, given the high rates of
population growth and rise of the industrial activity, which was almost non-existent before the
First World War and notably expanded in, at that time, a purely agricultural economy. Since
then, Argentina has experienced a continual housing shortage.
Its constant population growth and the migration of its farmers to urban areas, coupled
with an inflow of immigrants to the major cities of Argentina, are all elements leading to ever
increasing demand for housing with respect to its supply. This inevitably led to increases in
rental prices. Since 1921, the government has reacted to these developments by introducing
rent control policies, much like governments in many other countries. As a pendulum, phases
of stronger regulations have been followed by those of the deregulation. In 2016, a draft of
national law on rental prices (Proyecto de una Ley Nacional de Alquileres) was submitted,
which is aimed at strengthening rental market regulations.2 Among other things, it provides
for capping rent increases by an average growth rate of the consumer price index and the wage
index as well as extending the minimum contract duration from two to three years. Thus, we
might experience a new phase of increasing intensity of rental market regulations.
Although Argentina seems to be a country of homeowners, the housing rental market is
becoming more and more important, as seen in Figure 1. The share of tenant households used
to be very high (62%) in 1947, then it declined until it reached its historic minimum in 2001
2Ley de alquileres y reforma del CC y CN; http://www.senado.gov.ar/parlamentario/parlamentaria/
374144/downloadPdf.
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(about 11%). Since 2001, tenant occupancy rates have steadily increased, attaining 17% in
2017. Similar evolution is observable in Buenos Aires, its largest city, where the rate went from
82% in 1947 to 21% in 1991 and back above 34% in 2018.
In Argentina, interventions in the housing market use rent control and other restrictive
measures were only effective during two short periods, being rather ineffective the rest of the
time. During Perón’s first presidency, the real estate market was virtually paralyzed. This was
a consequence of a 1943 law that froze rents and interrupted evictions. These norms, in force
until the fall of Perón in 1955, produced a severe contraction in the supply of dwellings for
rent, because the profit expectations of real-state investors abruptly declined. Moreover, when
Perón took the reins for his second presidential term, the economic outlook was very poor.
Under the circumstances, where rents were frozen and evictions not permitted, the real
amount paid by occupants shrank to almost nothing and the market for houses for rental
purposes almost disappeared. In what remained from the formerly large rental market, various
means of avoiding the regulations were invented. For example, in order to get a place to
stay, tenants agreed with landlords to pay the property taxes in addition to the rent. The
fiscal appetite of the different governments also did not contribute to the effectiveness of rent
controls. In fact, as landlords must pay income tax on rents received, contracted rents do not
reflect reality: tenants pay the sum listed in the contract plus an additional amount through
previously agreed promissory notes. Additionally, rental contracts require stamp duties. In
almost all cases, the contract is not stamped by the parties in order to avoid this tax or is
marked by half of the amount as agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant. The lack
of stamp duties payment does not make a contract null. In case of eviction, the only risk that
the landlord is bearing is the necessity to pay the stamp duties plus a penalty fee, which turns
out to be ridiculously small when inflation is high.
There is an extensive literature on the effects of rent control, as shown in Table 1. Most
studies address the US experience: nine out of 14 listed in the table. The rest focus on European
countries, mostly Scandinavian (Denmark and Sweden). The majority of studies (nine) work
with microdata, typically at the private household level. The studies concentrate on topics like
residential mobility, misallocation of housing, rents, and homelessness. Few consider the effects
on residential construction (Sims, 2007). The statistical methodology covers a wide range of
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techniques varying from simple cross-sectional regressions through panel data models and non-
linear models such as proportional hazard model, duration model, and logit. To our knowledge,
there are no studies using econometric tools to analyze the effects of governmental regulations
on the Argentinian housing market.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, it concentrates on the impact of rent
control in a middle-income Latin American country. Second, this is the first assessment of
rental regulations for Argentina and the overall region. Third, it uses a novel database with
long-term time series of the Argentinian housing market.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, their sources and transfor-
mations. Section 3 presents the estimation methodology. Section 4 reports and discusses the
estimation results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2. Data
In this section, the sources, transformations and characteristics of data are described. The
list of data with their sources are reported in Table 2. Below, we describe the data used in this
study in more detail.
It is difficult to obtain overlapping time series for the variables under different base periods
in Latin American countries over the long-run and Argentina is not an exception. It is typical
that, once the base period is changed, the old time series (based on the previous base period)
are discontinued and the new ones are not extended backward for a significant number of years.
Frequently, a change in the base period usually reflects improvements in statistical procedures
that began in Argentina during the 1960s when its statistical system started developing. This
makes unclear whether the observed differences across base periods effectively reflect changes
in the series or merely shows the peculiarities of statistical procedures. Regardless, we carefully
describe the variables as shown in Table 2 and adopt the “second-best methodology” consisting
in the simple “chaining” of the series as the only alternative available.
2.1. Dependent variable
As our dependent variable, we take the average monthly rent index of a room in the City
of Buenos Aires for the period 1914–1934 published by the Departamento del Trabajo of the
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Ministerio del Interior through its statistics division. From 1934 to 1961, the numbers also
come from a contemporary index considering the consumption of a 4×4.5 meters room by an
unskilled worker’s family type (parents and two children under 14 years old) living in the City
of Buenos Aires. We take the data from publications of the former Dirección Nacional de
Estadística y Censos (DNEC, hereafter). This office also provides information for the 1961–
1976 period and the variable turns out to be the rent of a house (excluding electricity) according
to a survey on the living conditions of a working family (“familia obrera”) carried out in the
capital of Argentina.
According to the official statistics that we follow, rent for 1977–1988 comes from the con-
sumer price index and include housing expenses. The set of goods and services selected in
the expenses are sanitary repairs, tiles, cement, bricks, wood, and paint. This group excludes
other things (gas, the cost to refill a balloon of gas, kerosene, charcoal and electricity). The
index considers the capital of Argentina. However, from March 1977 the index includes the
capital of the country and 19 suburban communities. The information for the index comes
from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (Permanent Household Survey) and the data are
elaborated and published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC is the
Spanish acronym for the National Institute for Statistic and Censuses). As for 1988–1999, the
index measures the evolution of the monthly effectively rent paid by households, with expenses
considered separately.
For 1999–2013, the survey of the rental prices is monthly and based on the division of the
geographical area into work zones composed of the City of Buenos Aires and the Greater Buenos
Aires.
Finally, for 2014–2017, data come from the Dirección General de Estadística y Censos of
the City of Buenos Aires. The IPCBA (this is a Spanish acronym for Consumer Price Index of
the City of Buenos Aires) contains the rent variable.
The time series of monthly rent coming from different sources are linked to obtain a series
covering the period 1914–2017, which is the first attempt of this sort for Argentina. This
nominal rent is deflated using the consumer price index. The growth rates of the resulting time
series are displayed in Figure 2.
In order to account for the methodological differences across these seven periods, in all
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regressions below, six dummies are introduced, for 1914–1934, 1935–1960, 1961–1976, 1977–
1988, 1989–1998, and 1999-2013, denoted as D_meth1, . . . , D_meth6.
2.2. Control variables
Interest rate. From 1914 to 2008, the series represents the interest rate for 30-days loans in
domestic currency (peso) to first-line companies (prime rate). From 2009 on, it is the 30-days
discount rate to promissory notes. Ferreres et al. (2005) provides information for the 1910–2004
period. The series is updated with information from the web page of the Banco Central de la
República Argentina.
Gross Domestic Product. As usual, the series is the sum of good and services produced
by the Argentine economy during a year. Ferreres et al. (2005) covers 1910–2004, while the
national accounts compiled from INDEC allow us to properly update the series.
Consumer Price Index. The series is from Ferreres et al. (2005), who presents values up
to 2004. However, to continue the series, we have to consider the government’s intervention
in the Argentine Statistics Bureau (INDEC) from 2007 through 2015. During these years, the
government started reporting official statistics that were systematically below the unofficial
ones. We follow Cavallo and Bertolotto (2016) to update the annual series.
Population. This variable indicates the projected population in thousands of persons. From
1910 to 2004 the data come from Ferreres et al. (2005), while the series up to 2017 are from
Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires.
Building permits. This variable broadly corresponds to the number of building permits,
i.e., the administrative procedures through which the authorization for the construction of a
building is requested. Each building permit generally corresponds to a work, so this variable
largely reflects the number of buildings authorized. The source is the Revista Económica from
the Banco de la Nación Argentina for the 1926–1934 period. A special request by the authors
was made to the Dirección General de Estadística y Censos of the City of Buenos Aires for 1934–
1943 data. From 1944 to now, data proceed from the building series of the national statistical
office of Argentina through its different names (Dirección, Nacional del Servicio Estadístico,
Dirección Nacional de Investigación Estadística y Censos, Dirección Nacional de Estadística y
Censos, and INDEC). Unfortunately, to our knowledge, information about building permits is
not available prior to 1926.
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The evolution of control variables between 1910 and 2017 is shown in Figure 2.
2.3. Regulation indices
This study focuses on the effects of governmental policies. Therefore, we need measures of
their intensity. For this purpose, we use the restrictive rental market regulations indices elab-
orated by Kholodilin (2018) and Weber (2017). These indices cover three types of regulations:
rent control, tenure security, and housing rationing. All three indices vary between 0 and 1: the
higher the index, the more intense the regulation. The indices are constructed for Argentina
based on a thorough analysis of the corresponding legal acts. Table 4 summarizes all relevant
laws underlying the rental market regulation indices utilized in this study. Figure 3 depicts the
evolution of the three indices between 1910 and 2017, with shaded areas denoting both World
Wars. For comparison purposes, it also shows the evolution of the indices for Latin America
and the world.
Rent control index measures the intensity restrictions imposed on the level of rent and its
rate of increase. The economists distinguish between first- and second-generation rent controls
(Arnott, 1995). The first generation implies a rent freeze, when rents are fixed at some level. For
instances, in Argentina rents were frozen three times: 1921–1924, 1943–1956, and 1965–1970,
at the January 1, 1920 level, at the December 31, 1942 level, and at the previous contract level,
respectively. Under the second-generation rent control, the rent level, as a rule, is not frozen;
instead, the restrictions are imposed on the growth rate of rent, which is typically anchored to
some measure reflecting the cost of living. In this way, lawmakers guarantee that the real rental
revenues of the landlords are not eroded by inflation. In Argentina, in 1970, rent increases were
capped by the rate of increase of the official index of living costs (índice de costo de vida).
However, between 1987 and 2014, the rents were nominally frozen, for the government did not
allow rent to be indexed by inflation in order to avoid an inflationary spiral.
The tenure security index reflects the degree of protection that tenants have from evictions
by landlords. The main instruments of protection are 1) eviction protection during term or
period; 2) eviction protection at the end of term or period; 3) imposition of a minimum duration
of rental contracts; and 4) prohibition of short-term (less than one year) tenancies. Between
1921 and 1949, the first two tools were applied in Argentina: contracts could be automatically
prolonged by tenants and landlords could only evict them, if they had justifiable reasons to
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do so. These reasons included: 1) non-payment of rent; 2) abusive use of the rented premises;
3) tenants initiating scandals (escándalo); 4) the owner needs the dwelling for himself and his
family; or 5) the owner plans to rebuild the house, having low housing capacity, in order to
create more dwellings, etc. In 1949–1957, the restriction on the minimum duration of rental
contracts was added. In 1957, this requirement was abandoned. Finally, from 1976 on, the
automatic prolongation of existing rental contracts was no longer provided to the tenants.
However, during the term of those contracts, the tenants are still protected from eviction.
The housing rationing index measures the intensity of redistribution of the existing housing
stock. In Argentina, between 1949 and 1965, three such policies were applied: 1) obligatory
registration of vacant dwellings by landlords and subletting tenants within 15 days; 2) landlords
are required to let their dwellings within 30 days; and 3) in the Federal Capital and National
Territories, the authorities can requisition vacant dwellings.
All variables are tested for stationarity. The results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-
root tests are reported in Table 5. For the real interest rate (RIRate), the null hypothesis of
unit-root (presence of random walk) can, in most cases, be rejected at conventional significance
levels. Other variables become stationary after taking first differences. Only the growth rate
of population (DLPop) appears to be non-stationary reflecting a secular decline in the speed of
expansion of Argentina’s population.
3. Econometric methodology
In order to investigate the potential impacts of rental regulations on the real growth rates
of housing rents, we use different estimation approaches.
First, we take advantage of a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) model:










l,t−1 + εt (1)
where yt is the growth rate of real rent in period t; xCkt is a k-th control variable; xRlt is an l-th
regulation index (our focus variable); εt is the disturbance term; and α, β’s, γ’s, and ρ are
parameters to be estimated. Note that explanatory indices are taken with a lag in order to
avoid possible endogeneity. Here we use a dynamic model in order to account for the possibility
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of persistent rent growth.
Second, we employ amultivariate adaptive regression splines (MARS) algorithm. This
is a non-parametric piecewise regression technique that was introduced by Friedman (1991). It
is especially useful for identifying non-linearities in regression models. These are modeled using
potentially different slopes for each predictor. Thus, unlike the linear regression, MARS does
not assume that coefficients are stable across the entire range of each variable and instead uses
splines in order to fit piecewise linear continuous functions. This is very useful when considering
long-run economic processes, where policy responses may be subject to structural breaks. The
main advantages of MARS compared to other non-linear models (e.g., polynomial models) are
the simplicity of the resulting econometric model, its interpretability, and automatic model
selection.
Here, we use matrix notation in order to formulate MARS. The dependent variable Y =
(y1, . . . , yT )′ is regressed upon a set of potential independent variables X = (X1, . . . , XM) with
Xm = (xm1, xm2, . . . , xmT )′, where M = K +L. In addition, the MARS uses the so-called basic
functions (BF) of the form (x− c)+ = max{0, x− c} and (c− x)+ = max{0, c− x}, where the
subscript “+” means that the function takes only the positive value or zero in case of negative
difference. Such pairs of linear functions are called “hinge functions” and the constant c denotes
a knot, where the slope changes. The collection of all possible BFs, C, is used to construct the
following model:
C = {(x− c)+, (c− x)+} with c ∈ {xm, xm2, . . . , xmT} and m = 1, . . . ,M (2)
Each function is piecewise linear with a knot c at every xmt, and, in case if all input val-
ues are distinct, there are TM hinge functions, or equivalently 2TM basic functions. The
model-building strategy is similar to a classical forward stepwise regression using as inputs the
functions from the set C and their products. The complete MARS model is formulated as:
Y = β0 +
M∑
m=1
βmhm(X) +  (3)
where hm(X) is a BF; a product of two or more such functions, if interactions between variables
are permitted; or the original predictor, if it exerts a linear impact on the dependent variable.
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Here, however, we do not consider possible interactions. The coefficients βm are estimated by
minimizing the sum of squared (residual) errors (SSE), similar to a standard linear regression
model.
4. Results
The OLS regression estimation results are shown in Table 6. Columns (1) and (2) report
the results of two models estimated using OLS. Both models include all control variables. In
addition, model (1) contains the Rental Market Regulation Index (RMRI) and housing rationing
index, while model (2) contains rent laws, tenure security, and housing rationing indices. Given
that RMRI is a simple average of rent laws and tenure security indices, we can only use it
together with the housing rationing index in order to avoid multicollinearity. The standard
errors are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent.3 The autoregressive term is only
significant in model (2). However, it has a negative sign, indicating rather erratic fluctuations
of real rent growth rates. The only control variable that is statistically significant is the real
interest rate. None of the regulation indices are statistically significant.
Columns (3) and (4) report the same two models estimated using MARS. The non-linearity
is only allowed for regulation indices. The autoregressive term is dropped from both non-
linear models. The models always include the real interest rate, which appears to exert a
statistically significant negative impact on the growth of real rents. In model (3), in addition,
the Rental Market Regulation Index is contained. It has a negative effect on real rents, when it
exceeds 0.542 and no effect below this threshold, see Figure 4. Such regulation intensity is only
achieved during two episodes: 1923–1925 and 1945–1957. This is the aftermath of both World
Wars. The first period is consistent with the introduction of rent control; an innovation that
probably tended to act as a surprise for the economy at that time and consequently exercised its
effects. The second period coincides with the presidency of Perón when Argentina experienced
a turbulent subordination of the economy to politics (a “hyper-politization of economic life”,
in terms of Gerchunoff and Díaz Alejandro 1989, p. 59). This subordinate position was one
of the reasons for the economic enlargement of the public sector and the upsurge of controls,
3These are estimated using the vcvHC function of the R package sandwich (MacKinnon and White, 1985).
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which clearly included rents. The aim and priority of the Perón’s government was to rapidly
modify income distribution to create an economic order capable of preserving the distributive
model pursued. Thus, rental regulations seem to be effective only when they are a novelty or
a very strong policy, as they were during these periods.
5. Conclusions
In this study, we analyze the effects of rental market regulations in Argentina on the growth
of real housing rent. We find that these regulations did exert a statistically significant impact
on rent dynamics. They appear to dampen real rent increases. However, these effects are
observed during two short periods following both World Wars: 1923–1925 and 1945–1957. This
means that rental market regulations are effective when both rent control and tenure security are
novel or very strong. Here, however, we do not consider potential effects on other aspects of the
housing market, such as residential construction, quality of housing, and homeownership rate.4
These effects can counteract the policy-driven declines in real rents making such interventions
far from desirable as a tool of rendering the housing affordable.
Hence, the policy recommendation for the governments of middle-income Latin American
countries would be to not rely on rent controls and too strong tenure security, since when they
are strong, they generate various negative byproducts, while, when they are weak, they hardly
slow rent increases.
Literature
Arnott, R. (1995). Time for revisionism on rent control? Journal of Economic Perspectives 9 (1),
99–120.
Ault, R. W., J. D. Jackson, and R. P. Saba (1994). The effect of long-term rent control on
tenant mobility. Journal of Urban Economics 35 (2), 140–158.
4As seen in our literature review in Table 1, rent control can lead to all sorts of undesirable effects. In
addition, Kholodilin et al. (2018) show that rental regulations lead to higher homeownership rates in the long
run, thus destroying the rental housing market.
10
Autor, D. H., C. J. Palmer, and P. A. Pathak (2014). Housing market spillovers: Evidence from
the end of rent control in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Journal of Political Economy 122 (3),
661–717.
Benítez, J. (2016). Buscar un techo. La problemática de los inquilinos y los alquileres en la
Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires. Colección es nuestra la ciudad 2, 5–8.
Bettendorf, L. and E. Buyst (1997). Rent control and virtual prices: A case study for interwar
Belgium. The Journal of Economic History 57 (3), 654–673.
Cavallo, A. and M. Bertolotto (2016). Serie completa de inflación de Argentina desde 1943 a
2016 (Filling the gap in Argentina’s inflation data).
Cosacov, N. (2012). Alquileres e inquilinos en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Una radiografía.
Buenos Aires: Laboratorio de Políticas Públicas.
Diamond, R., T. McQuade, and F. Qian (2019). The effects of rent control expansion on tenants,
landlords, and inequality: Evidence from San Francisco. American Economic Review 109 (9),
3365–94.
Early, D. W. and E. O. Olsen (1998). Rent control and homelessness. Regional Science and
Urban Economics 28 (6), 797–816.
Ferreres, O. J. et al. (2005). Dos siglos de economía argentina (1810-2004): historia argentina
en cifras. Fundación Norte y Sur.
Friedman, J. H. (1991). Multivariate adaptive regression splines. The annals of statistics 19 (1),
1–67.
Gerchunoff, P. and C. Díaz Alejandro (1989). Peronist economic policies, 1946–55. In G. di
Tella and R. Dornbusch (Eds.), The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946–83, pp. 59–88. St
Antony’s/Macmillan Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Glaeser, E. L. and E. F. Luttmer (2003). The misallocation of housing under rent control. The
American Economic Review 93 (4), 1027–1046.
11
Grimes, P. W. and G. A. Chressanthis (1997). Assessing the effect of rent control on homeless-
ness. Journal of Urban Economics 41 (1), 23–37.
Kholodilin, K., S. Kohl, Y. Prozorova, and J. Licheron (2018). Social policy or crowding-out?
tenant protection in comparative long-run perspective. Higher School of Economics Research
Paper No. WP BRP.
Kholodilin, K. A. (2018). Measuring stick-style housing policies: A multi-country longitudinal
database of governmental regulations. DIW Berlin Discussion Paper 1727.
Krol, R. and S. Svorny (2005). The effect of rent control on commute times. Journal of Urban
Economics 58 (3), 421–436.
MacKinnon, J. G. and H. White (1985). Some heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix
estimators with improved finite sample properties. Journal of econometrics 29 (3), 305–325.
Moon, C.-G. and J. G. Stotsky (1993). The effect of rent control on housing quality change: a
longitudinal analysis. Journal of Political Economy 101 (6), 1114–1148.
Munch, J. R. and M. Svarer (2002). Rent control and tenancy duration. Journal of Urban
Economics 52 (3), 542–560.
Olsen, E. O. (1972). An econometric analysis of rent control. Journal of Political Econ-
omy 80 (6), 1081–1100.
Reese, E., F. Almansi, J. Del Valle, and J. Andrés (2014). Políticas habitacionales y la regulación
del alquiler en Argentina. In A. G. Blanco, V. Fretes Cibils, and A. F. Muñoz (Eds.),
Busco casa en arriendo: promover el alquiler tiene sentido, Chapter 4, pp. 93–132. Banco
Interamericano de Desarrollo.
Sims, D. P. (2007). Out of control: What can we learn from the end of Massachusetts rent
control? Journal of Urban Economics 61 (1), 129–151.
Skak, M. and G. Bloze (2013). Rent control and misallocation. Urban Studies 50 (10), 1988–
2005.
12
Svarer, M., M. Rosholm, and J. R. Munch (2005). Rent control and unemployment duration.
Journal of Public Economics 89 (11-12), 2165–2181.
Weber, J. P. (2017). The regulation of private tenancies — a multi-country analysis. PhD
Dissertation, Universität Regensburg. Available at https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/
36228/1/Weber%20%282017%29_The%20Regulation%20of%20Private%20Tenancies%20A%
20Multi-Country%20Analysis.pdf.
Wilhelmsson, M., R. Andersson, and K. Klingborg (2011). Rent control and vacancies in
Sweden. International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis 4 (2), 105–129.
13
Appendix
Table 1: Literature on rent control effects
Study Place and period Type of data Method Effects






Munch and Svarer (2002) Denmark, 1992–
1999





Krol and Svorny (2005) New Jersey, 1980,
1990, and 2000













micro, housing survey little effect on new housing construction, shift
units away from rental status, and lower rents
Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) New York City,
1993




Autor et al. (2014) Cambridge (Mas-
sachusetts), 1995
micro, parcels of land cross-
sectional
regression
large and significant positive indirect effect of de-
control on the valuation of properties that were
exposed to controlled units
Moon and Stotsky (1993) New York, 1978–
1987
micro, housing units Tobit and
panel data
model
decline in the quality of rent-controlled dwellings






macro, census data TSLS higher homelessness
Early and Olsen (1998) 44 US metropoli-
tan areas, 1985–
1988





net effect: lower homelessness





increase of cost of landlords is larger than in-
crease of real income of households in controlled
units, hence, negative net cost for society
Svarer et al. (2005) Denmark, 1997–
2000





individuals occupying controlled units are less
(more) likely to accept jobs outside (in) their
local market labor, hence, longer unemployment
duration




significantly lower rents in the controlled sectors
and to a negligible increase in the uncontrolled
rent
Wilhelmsson et al. (2011) Sweden, 1994–
2004
macro, municipalities panel data
model
lower vacancy rates
Diamond et al. (2019) San Francisco,
1990–2016




decreased mobility of tenants in controlled
dwellings; conversion of rental dwellings to con-
dos
14
Table 2: Data definitions and sources
Variable Period Description Source
Rent 1914–1934 Average monthly rent of a room in the
city of Buenos Aires
Ministerio del Interior (1949), Investi-
gaciones Sociales
Rent 1934–1956 An unskilled worker’s family type (par-
ents and two children under 14 years
old) in the city of Buenos Aires con-
suming a 4×4,5 m2 room
Dirección Nacional de Estadística y
Censos (1957), Índices del costo del
nivel de vida, actividad industrial y
costo de la construcción
Rent 1956–1961 Dirección Nacional de Estadística y
Censos, Boletín Mensual de Estadística
de la República Argentina, various is-
sues
Rent 1961–1976 Considers the rent of a house, exclud-
ing electricity, according to the survey
on living conditions of a working family
(“familia obrera”)
Dirección Nacional de Estadística y
Censos, Boletín Mensual de Estadística
de la República Argentina and Boletín
Estadístico Trimestral, various issues
Rent 1977–1984 Rent considers the expenses for hous-
ing. The set of goods and services se-
lected in housing expenses are: rent,
sand, sanitary fixtures, tiles, cement,
bricks, wood, and paint. This group
does not include fuel (gas, the cost to
refill a balloon of gas, kerosene, char-
coal) and electricity
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y
Censos. Fascículo Índice de precios al
consumidor y Salarios industriales, var-
ious issues
Rent 1985–1988 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y
Censos, Estadística Mensual, various is-
sues
15
. . . continued
Variable Period Description Source
Rent 1989–1995 Measures the evolution of the monthly
effectively rent paid by households that
live in rented homes. The rental service
covers the accommodation, excluding
the payment of services (electricity, gas,
water, heating, use of the telephone).
It does not include: repair and main-
tenance of the dwelling (materials and
labor), electricity, sanitary services, gas
and other fuels
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y
Censos Estadística Mensual, various is-
sues
Rent 1996–1999 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y
Censos, Indec Informa, various issues
Rent 1999–2008 Rent, excluding fuels for housing, elec-
tricity, water and sanitary services, ma-
terials, as well as work for repairs and
common expenses of the home
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y
Censos. Indec Informa, various issues
Rent 2008–2013 Rental of housing excludes: basic ser-
vices and fuel for housing (gas in carafe,
natural gas by network, kerosene); elec-
tricity; water and sanitary services
(sewers, and storm drains); materials
for repairs; common expenses of hous-
ing (expense)
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y
Censos. Indec Informa, various issue
Rent 2014–2017 Rental of the house, excluding mate-
rials for the repair of the house (pre-
mixed plaster, faucet set, ceramic floor,
and interior paint), services for the re-
pair of the house (locksmith, gas electri-
cian, painter, plumber), running water
supply, common expenses for housing
(expense), electricity and gas (packag-
ing and network).
Dirección General de Estadística y




. . . continued
Variable Period Description Source
Building per-
mits
1926–1934 Number of administrative procedures
through which the authorization for
the construction of the building is re-
quested. This variable largely reflects
the amount of works that are autho-
rized




1934–1943 Available upon request from Dirección
General de Estadística y Censos de la
Ciudad de Buenos Aires
Building per-
mits
1943–2017 Dirección Nacional del Servicio Es-
tadístico, Anuario estadístico de la
República Argentina, Tomo I, Com-
pendio 1949-1950; Dirección Nacional
de Investigaciones, Estadística y Cen-
sos, Sintesis Estadística Mensual de
la República Argentina, various issues;
Dirección Nacional de Estadística y
Censo, Boletín Mensual de Estadística
de la República Argentina, various is-
sues; Dirección Nacional de Estadística
y Censos, Boletín de Estadística, var-
ious issues; Instituto Nacional de Es-
tadística y Censos, Boletín Estadístico
Trimestral, Edificación, Permisos para




1910–2004 Measures the variations in prices in Ar-
gentina
Ferreres et al. (2005)
Consumer
price index




. . . continued
Variable Period Description Source
Interest rate 1914–2004 From 1914 to 2008 is the rate for 30
days loans to first line companies. From
2009 onward, it is the interest rate of
discounted promissory notes
Dos siglos de Economía Argentina
Interest rate 2005–2017 Banco Central de la República Ar-
gentina: www.bcra.gob.ar
GDP 1910–2004 Gross Domestic Product of Argentina Ferreres et al. (2005)
GDP 2004–2017 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y
Censos. Cuentas nacionales
Births 1910–2004 Number of biths registered in Argentina
(whole country)
Ferreres et al. (2005)
Births 2004–2016 Dirección de Estadísticas e Informa-




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Results of augmented Dickey-Fuller stationarity tests
Variable no drift no trend with drift no trend with drift and trend
Levels
LRRent 0.237 0.691 0.775
RIRate 0.010 0.060 0.195
LPop 0.979 0.010 0.875
Lcgdppc 0.984 0.777 0.020
LPermits 0.087 0.798 0.010
Differences
DLRRent 0.010 0.010 0.024
DRIRate 0.010 0.010 0.010
DLPop 0.282 0.413 0.010
DLcgdppc 0.010 0.010 0.010























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Tenant rate in Argentina, 1947–2018












Source: Benítez (2016); Cosacov (2012); Reese et al. (2014).
33
Figure 2: Dependent and control variables, 1910–2017
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Figure 3: Rental market regulation indices in Argentina, 1910–2017












































































Figure 4: Regulation effects on real rent growth
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